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Each government agency uses a uniform figure to measure the value of a 
statistical life. This is a serious mistake. The very theory that underlies current practice 
calls for far more individuation of the relevant values. According to that theory, the value 
of statistical lives should vary across risks. More controversially, the value of a statistical 
life should vary across individuals -- even or especially if the result would be to produce 
a lower number for some people than for others. One practical implication is that a higher 
value should be given to programs that reduce cancer risks. Should government use a 
higher VSL for programs that disproportionately benefit the wealthy -- and a lower VSL 
for programs that disproportionately benefit the poor? A serious complication here is that 
sometimes the beneficiaries of regulation pay only a fraction or even none of its cost; 
when this is so, the appropriate VSL for poor people might be higher, on distributional 
grounds, than market evidence suggests. An understanding of this point has implications 
for foundational issues about government regulation, including valuation of persons in 




Are Poor People Worth Less Than Rich People? Disaggregating the Value of 
Statistical Lives 
 




  For over two decades, executive orders have required regulatory agencies to 
engage in cost-benefit analysis of major regulations,
1 and Congress has imposed the same 
requirement in several statutes.
2 To conduct cost-benefit analysis, agencies must assign 
monetary values to human lives. What numbers do they choose? Do some deaths count 
for more than others? 
The Environmental Protection Agency uses a uniform value for a statistical life 
(VSL): $6.1million.
3 Other agencies use both lower and higher numbers, with a range, in 
recent years, between $1.5 million (the Federal Aviation Administration in 1990
4) to the 
FDA’s current figure of $6.5 million.
5  While substantial differences can be found across 
agencies,
6 uniformity is the intended practice within agencies.
7 No agency treats cancer 
                                                 
1 See Stephen Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy 120-35 (5
th ed. 2002). 
2 See, e.g., 15 USC 2601 et seq. (Toxic Substances Control Act); 7 USC 136 et seq. (Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act); 42 USC 300g-1 (Safe Drinking Water Act). 
3 See 66 Fed. Reg. at 7012. In its July 2003 regulation governing food labeling of trans fatty acids, the Food 
and Drug Administration used a VSL of $6.5 million, see 68 Fed. Reg. 41434, 41488 (July 11, 2003); in its 
March 13, 2003 proposed rule on dietary ingredients and dietary supplements, the same agency suggested a 
VSL of $5 million, see 68 Fed. Reg. 12158, 12229 (using this value to calculate the “value of a statistical 
life day”). 
4 The Department of Transportation now uses a higher figure, but one that is still low in comparison to 
what most agencies do. See 67 Fed. Reg. 17556, 17559 (April 10, 2002) ($2.7 million). 
5 See Table 1 below; Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When 
Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J Legal Stud 146 (2000). 
6 These differences appear to be inexplicable. 
7 See Adler and Posner, supra note. There are some differences within agencies across contexts and across 
time, but those differences do not appear to be deliberate. See, e.g., the FDA sources cited in note 1 supra. 
The most explicit discussions of varying VSL have come from the EPA. In its 2003 discussion of 
hazardous air pollutants, see 68 Fed. Reg. 1660, 1693 (Jan. 13, 2003), the EPA noted that there “is general 
agreement that the value to an individual of a reduction is mortality risk can vary based on several factors, 
including the age of the individual, the type of risk, the level of control the individual has over the risk, the 
individual’s attitude toward risk, and the health status of the individual.” Nonetheless, the agency 
announced, without offering reasons, that it “prefers not to draw distinctions in the monetary value assigned 
to the lives saved even if they differ in age, health status, socioeconomic status, gender or other 
characteristic of the adult population.” Id.  
An extended discussion of related issues can be found in the EPA’s arsenic proposal, see 65 Fed. 
Reg. 38888, 38945 (June 22, 2000). There the EPA noted that the “factors which may influence the 
estimate of economic benefits associated with avoided cancer fatalities include (1) a possible ‘cancer   
premium’ (i.e., the additional value or sum that people may be willing to pay to avoid the experiences of 




risks, or mortality risks that involve unusual suffering, as worthy of more concern than 
other risks. No agency values the lives of poor people less than the lives of rich people. 
No agency distinguishes between whites and African-Americans or between  men and 
women.  For statistical lives, the governing idea is that each life is worth exactly the 
same. With respect to cost-benefit analysis, much is disputed.
8 But on the idea of a 
uniform value per life saved, there is a solid consensus, at least in terms of regulatory 
practice.
9 
  I intend to question that consensus here, and to do so in a way that raises 
foundational issues about the economic valuation of human lives. I suggest that a uniform 
value is obtuse. Under the very approach that agencies use to produce the current 
numbers, the value of a statistical life should vary dramatically, in a way that would lead 
to substantial individual differences across risks, and even substantial differences along 
demographic lines. The same theory that accounts for current practice also justifies a 
higher VSL for wealthy people than for poor people. Indeed, that theory argues for 
dramatic differences in VSL across racial and ethnic groups.
10 More particularly, I 
                                                                                                                                                 
fatality); (2) the willingness of people to pay more over time to avoid mortality risk as their income rises; 
(3) a possible premium for accepting involuntary risks as opposed to voluntary [sic] assumed risks; (4) the 
greater risk aversion of  the general population as opposed to workers in the wage-risk valuation studies; 
(5) ‘altruism’ or the willingness of people to pay more to reduce risk in other sectors of the population and 
(6) a consideration of health status and life years remaining at the time of premature mortality.” The EPA 
acknowledged that these factors “may significantly increase the present value estimate,” but said that “there 
is currently neither a clear consensus among economists about how to simultaneously analyze each of these 
adjustments nor is there adequate empirical data to support quantitative estimates for all potentially 
significant adjustment factors.”  Id. Hence the EPA solicited comments on these issues and said that it 
would ask its Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) to conduct a review. Id. As noted below, the comments 
produced a sensitivity analysis that contains several 7% upward adjustments from the $6.1 million figure, 
see below, but the SAB’s review suggested that at the present time, upward adjustments were not justified 
by existing evidence, see below. 
8 For various perspectives, see Adler and Posner, supra note; W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (1994); Frank 
Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless (2004). 
9 An arguable exception, noted below, involves the debate over whether agencies should focus on lives or 
instead life-years; the latter approach might well value older people less than younger ones. For discussion, 
see Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, Colum L Rev (forthcoming 2004). An 
implicit challenge to the consensus can be found in W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, J Legal Stud. W. Kip 
Viscusi and Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates 
Throughout the World, 27 J Risk and Uncertainty 5, 7 (2003), notes the existence of heterogeneity by 
income, union status, and age, and explains that the “existence of such heterogeneity provides a cautionary 
note for policy.” 
10 Such differences are found in W. Kip Viscusi, Racial Differences in Labor Market Values of a Statistical 
Life, 27 J. Risk & Uncertainty 239, 252 tbl.5 (2003) [hereinafter Viscusi, Racial Differences]. To get a bit 
ahead of the story: I am not arguing that government should assign a higher VSL to white lives than to 
African-American lives.  I am speaking here of demographic differences that would emerge from a fully 




suggest that VSL varies along two dimensions. First, it varies across risks. For example, 
there is reason to think that VSL is higher for cancer deaths than for sudden, 
unanticipated deaths
11; deaths that are accompanied by high levels of pain and suffering 
should be expected to produce a higher VSL. Human beings face countless mortality 
risks, and it would be truly bizarre to maintain that for each of these risks, VSL is 
identical. Second, VSL varies across individuals.
12 People who are risk averse will show 
a higher VSL than people who are risk-seeking. People who are thirty will show a higher 
VSL than people who are sixty.
13 Those who are rich will show a higher VSL than those 
who are poor.  
If we put together these two forms of variability -- across risks and across persons 
-- we will find that the unitary $6.1 million figure is far too crude. In fact, each person in 
society has a particular VSL for each and every risk, resulting in a fully individuated 
VSL.
14 Such a fully individuated VSL would mean, for example, that the VSL of some 
racial groups would likely be lower than that for others.
15 But these differences would not 
be the result of a governmental decision to take racial characteristics into account; in fact 
it would not be a product of any kind of group-level discrimination on government’s part, 
                                                                                                                                                 
these values are aggregated, the white VSL would likely be higher than the African-American VSL, simply 
because of disparities in wealth and income. Richer people pay more for safe cars and smoke alarms than 
poor people do. See below for further discussion. 
11 See James K. Hammitt and Jin-Tau Liu, Effects of Disease Type and Latency on the Value of Mortality 
Risk, 28 J Risk and Uncertainty 73 (2004) (finding that willingness to pay to reduce a cancer death is about 
one-third larger than WTP to reduce risk of a similar chronic, degenerative disease). 
12 See Viscusi and Aldy, supra note, at 18 (“transferring the estimates of a value of a statistical life to non-
labor market contexts, as is the case in benefit-cost analyses of environmental health policies for example, 
should recognize that different populations have different preferences over risks and different values on 
life-saving”). 
13 As found in Joseph P. Aldy and W. Kip Viscusi, Age Variations in Workers’ Value of a Statistical Life 
(2003), forthcoming. 
14 I am putting to one side the complication that sometimes values are constructed, rather than elicited, by 
social situations – an especially serious complication for contingent valuation studies. See John Payne et 
al., Measuring Constructed Preferences: Toward a Building Code, 19 J. Risk and Uncertainty 243 (1999); 
Cass R. Sunstein and Richard Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not An Oxymoron, 70 U Chi L Rev 1159, 
1177-1178 (2003). 
15 As found in W. Kip Viscusi, Racial Differences in Labor Market Values of a Statistical Life, 27 J Risk 
and Uncertainty 239 (2003); John D. Leeth and John Ruser, Compensating Wage Differentials for Fatal and 
Nonfatal Injury Risk by Gender and Race, 27 J Risk and Uncertainty 257 (2003). Viscusi finds that the 
overall white VSL is $15 million, while the overall African-American VSL is $7.2 million. For white 
females, the overall VSL is $9.4 million, compared to $18.8 million for white males; for African-American 




at least not when government is calculating VSL.
16 The differences would be the result of 
aggregating fully individual VSLs.  
  In practice, of course, a fully individuated VSL is not feasible, for two different 
reasons. First, government lacks the information that would permit the calculation. 
Regulators do not know how much each person would be willing to pay to reduce each 
statistical risk; categories are therefore inevitable. Second, many regulatory programs 
involve collective goods and therefore must protect many people at once. A clean air 
program, for example, cannot easily ensure that some people in a geographical region are 
exposed to no more than 10 parts per billion (ppb) of some pollutant, while others in the 
same region are subjected to 50 ppb. Because collective goods are typically involved in 
regulation, the problem is pervasive.  
Notwithstanding issues of feasibility, an understanding of the reasons for 
individuating VSL is important for two reasons. The first involves conceptual clarity. The 
theory behind the use of VSL and willingness to pay (WTP) remains poorly understood. 
An appreciation of the case for individuation will clarify the theory – both its rationale 
and its limitations, empirical and ethical. The second reason involves the possibility of 
moving some way in the direction of greater individuation. With respect to cancer risks, 
for example, there is reason to believe that VSL is significantly higher than the amounts 
produced by examining studies of workplace accidents. For this reason, the government’s 
current numbers for cancer risks might well be too low, resulting in widespread 
underprotection of the public. A more troublesome point involves wealth differences. 
When risks are faced disproportionately by wealthy people, VSL, based on actual WTP, 
should be higher than $6.1 million -- just as it should be lower when it is faced 
disproportionately by poor people.
17 Full individuation is not feasible, but greater 
individuation would be quite easy. If my argument is correct, the question of 
                                                 
16 Discrimination might well lay in the background, of course; it almost certainly accounts for the unequal 
opportunities that produce lower VSL for African-Americans than for whites. See Viscusi, supra note, at 
255, for the suggestion that the racial differentials reflect “differences in market opportunities.” Viscusi 
goes on to suggest that “it is inappropriate to attribute the observed differences to a greater willingness by 
black workers to bear risk.” Id. In a sense Viscusi is correct; there is no reason to think that African-
American workers have an intrinsically greater predisposition to take risks. But in the market, one’s 
willingness to bear risks is a product of “market opportunities,” and hence those with fewer opportunities 
will show a greater willingness to bear risk. 
17 With this qualification: If poor people would be disproportionately benefited by assigning them a higher 




individuation should be a central part of the second generation of cost-benefit analysis – a 
step beyond the first generation debate about whether to do such analysis at all, and a step 
toward doing such analysis in a way that is more refined and more closely attuned to the 
consequences of regulations in terms of both welfare and distributional equity. 
A movement toward greater individuation of VSL would undoubtedly be 
extremely controversial. But it is not merely consistent with that theory that justifies 
current practice; it is mandated by it. In principle, government should not force people to 
buy protection against statistical risks at a price that seems to them excessive.
18 Someone 
should not be required to pay $70 to reduce a risk of 1/100,000 if she is willing to pay no 
more than $50. This point is enough to establish that the VSL of poor people, or of 
members of groups that are disproportionately poor, will be lower than that of rich 
people, or of members of groups that are disproportionately wealthy. The point bears on 
international issues as well as domestic ones. The VSL of citizens in poor nations will 
certainly be lower than that of citizens in wealthy nations – a fact with important (and 
easily misunderstood) implications for regulatory policy and law.
19 
Nothing in the discussion should be seen as treating the existing distribution of 
wealth, within nations or across the globe, as sacrosanct. Willingness to pay depends on 
ability to pay, which explains why wealthier people are expected to show a higher VSL 
than poorer people.
20 If a uniform VSL would benefit the poor, there is an argument for a 
uniform VSL. But regulation based on a uniform VSL may or may not produce a better 
distribution of income; in fact any redistribution may be perverse, and a single VSL 
might not promote equality at all. If wealthy people are the principal beneficiaries of a 
particular regulation chosen on the basis of a uniform VSL, and if the public as a whole 
pays for it, then any redistribution will benefit the wealthy, not the poor. And if poor 
people are forced to pay an amount for risk reduction that exceeds their WTP, desirable 
redistribution will hardly result; forced exchanges, on terms that people reject, are not a 
good way of redistributing wealth to the disadvantaged.  
                                                 
18 I offer a number of qualifications below. See TAN infra. 
19 See TAN infra. 
20 Other things being equal, that is; for some risks, some wealthy people might be willing to pay very little, 




On the other hand, it is possible that some regulatory programs, based on a 
uniform VSL, will help those in need, if their beneficiaries receive risk reduction for 
which they pay little or nothing – an issue to which I will devote considerable attention. 
A larger lesson follows. For purposes of law and politics, there is no sensible answer to 
the abstract question about the correct monetary value of human life. Any judgment about 
the appropriate VSL, and about individuation, must be heavily pragmatic; it must rest on 
the consequences of one or another choice. An important implication involves the 
assessment of VSL across nations. A poor nation would do well to adopt a lower VSL 
than a wealthy nation; for China or India, it would be disastrous to use a VSL equivalent 
to that of the United States or Canada. But this point should not be taken to support the 
ludicrous proposition that for donor institutions, both public and private, risk reduction in 
a wealthy nation deserves more attention than equivalent risk reduction in a poor nation. 
What are the implications for actual policy? There should be no controversy about 
the suggestion that in fact, VSL, measured by the standard tools, is likely to vary across 
risks and across persons. Nor should there be much controversy over the suggestion that 
according to the theory that now lies behind regulatory practice, far more variability is 
desirable. Certainly government should adopt a higher VSL when informed people are 
especially concerned about the underlying risks.
21 Whether government should use a 
higher or lower VSL across demographic lines cannot be answered simply. A great deal 
depends on the distributional consequences of allowing VSL to vary along those lines.  
  This Essay is organized as follows. Part II clarifies the theory behind the valuation 
of statistical lives. The major point here is that regulators do not really use a VSL; instead 
they use a mean WTP to eliminate a statistical risk. For example, agencies might say that 
they are using a VSL of $6 million, but if so, they are relying on evidence more or less 
establishing that the average person pays, or is paid, $60 to eliminate a risk of 1/10,000. 
Part III, in some ways the heart of the essay, explores the need for individuation across 
both risks and persons. Part IV offers a more ambitious discussion of the uses and limits 
of willingness to pay in regulatory policy. It distinguishes between easy and hard cases 
for using WTP. The central claim here is that the argument for using WTP is strongest 
when the beneficiaries of regulation must pay all of its cost -- though even in that event, 
                                                 




the argument is subject to important qualifications, above involving bounded rationality. 
The argument for using WTP is weaker when the beneficiaries of regulation pay only a 
fraction of that cost. In the latter circumstances, some people will benefit from regulation 
even if it is inefficient in economic terms. I discuss the implications of this point for a 
uniform or fully individuated VSL.  
 
2. WTP: Theory and Practice 
 
It has now become standard for regulatory agencies to assign monetary values to 
human lives. Consider the following table, which captures agency practices from 1996 
through 2003: 
 
Table1: Agency Values of Life, 1996-2003 
 
 
Agency  Regulation and Date  Value of Statistical Life 
Dept of Transportation/Federal Motor 
Carrier Safety Administration 
Safety Requirements for 
Operators of Small Passenger-
Carrying Commercial Motor 
Vehicles Used in Interstate 
Commerce 
August 12, 2003 
68 FR 47860-01 
$3 million 
Dept. of Health & Human 
Services/FDA 
Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids 
in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient 
Content Claims, and Health 
Claims 
July 11, 2003 
68 FR 41434-01 
$6.5 million 
Dept. of Agriculture Food Safety and 
Inspection Service 
Control of 1Listeria 
Monocytogenes in Ready-to-Eat 
Meat and Poultry Products 
June 6, 2003 
68 FR 34208-01 
$4.8 million 
Dept. of Health & Human 
Services/FDA 
Labeling Requirements for 
Systemic Antibacterial Drug 
Products Intended for Human Use 
February 6, 2003 
68 FR 6062-01 
$5 million 
Office of Management and Budget  Report to Congress on the Costs 
and Benefits of Federal 
Regulations 
February 3, 2003 
68 FR 5492-01 
$5 million 
EPA  Control of Emissions from 
Nonroad Large Spark-Ignition 
Engines, and Recreational 




Engines (Marine & Land-Based) 
November 8, 2002 
67 FR 68242-01  
EPA  National Primary Drinking Water 
Regulations: Arsenic and 
Clarifications to Compliance and 
New Source Contaminants 
Monitoring 
January 22, 2001 
66 FR 6976-01 
$6.1 million 
EPA  Control of Air Pollution from 
New Motor Vehicles: Heavy-
Duty Engine and Vehicle 
Standards and Highway Diesel 
Fuel Sulfur Control Requirements 
January 18, 2001 
66 FR 5002-01 
$6 million 
EPA  Control of Air Pollution from 
New Motor Vehicles: Tier 2 
Motor Vehicle Emissions 
Standards and Gasoline Sulfur 
Control Requirements 
February 10, 2000 
65 FR 6698-01 
$5.9 million 
EPA  Findings of Significant 
Contribution and Rulemaking on 
Section 125 Petitions for 
Purposes of Reducing Interstate 
Ozone Transport 
January 18, 2000 
65 FR 2674-01 
$5.9 million 
EPA  Final Standards for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants for Hazardous 
Waste Combustors 
September 30, 1999 
64 FR 52828-01 
$5.6 million 
EPA  National Primary Drinking Water 
Regulations: Disinfectants and 
Disinfection Byproducts 
December 16, 1998 
63 FR 69390-01 
$5.6 million 
Dept. of Transportation/FAA  Financial  Responsibility 
Requirements for Licensed 
Launch Activities 
August 26, 1998 
63 FR 45592-01 
$3 million 
Dept. of Health & Human 
Services/FDA 
Quality Mammography Standards 
October 28, 1997 
62 FR 55852-01 
$2 - 3 million 
Dept. of Health & Human 
Services/FDA 
Regulations Restricting the Sale 
and Distribution of Cigarettes and 
Smokeless Tobacco to Protect 
Children and Adolescents 
August 28, 1996 
61 FR 44396-01 




Dept. of Agriculture/Food Safety & 
Inspection Service 
Pathogen Reduction; Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control 
Point (HACCP) Systems 
July 25, 1996 
61 FR 38806-01 
$1.6 million 
Dept.  of  Transportation/FAA  Aircraft Flight Simulator Use in 
Pilot Training, Testing and 
Checking and at Training Centers 
July 2, 1996 
61 FR 34508-01 
$2.7 million 
Consumer  Product  Safety  Commission  Requirements for Labeling of 
Retail Containers of Charcoal 
May 3, 1996 
61 FR 19818-01 
$5 million 
Consumer Product Safety Commission  Large  Multiple-Tube  Fireworks 
Devices 
March 26, 1996 
61 FR 13084-01 
$3 - $7 million 
 
How does government generate monetary amounts of this kind? The answer 
comes from two kinds of evidence. The first and most important involves real-world 
markets, producing evidence of compensation levels for actual risks.
22 In the workplace 
and for consumer goods, safety has a price; market evidence is investigated to identify 
that price.
23 The second kind of evidence comes from contingent valuation studies, asking 
people how much they are willing to pay to reduce statistical risks.
24 The EPA’s $6.1 
million is a product of studies of actual workplace risks, attempting to determine how 
much workers are paid to assume mortality hazards.
25 The relevant risks usually are in 
the general range of 1/10,000 to 1/100,000.
26 The calculation of VSL is a product of 
simple arithmetic. Suppose that workers must be paid $600, on average, to eliminate a 
risk of 1/10,000. If so, the value of a statistical life would be said to be $6 million.  





                                                 
22 See W. Kip Viscusi, supra note. 
23 A valuable and comprehensive overview can be found in Viscusi and Aldy, supra note. 
24 See, e.g., James Hammitt and Jin-Tau Liu, Effects of Disease Type and Latency on the Value of 
Mortality Risk, 28 J Risk and Uncertainty 73 (2004). 
25 See Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs, supra note, for discussion. 
26 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates With Risks by Occupation and Industry, 42 Ec. 
Inquiry 29, 33 (2004) (showing fatality risks ranging from about 1/100,000 to 45/100,000). 
27 For an accessible outline, see Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U Chi L Rev 1345, 1485-
86 (2003). 




Table 2: Value of Life Studies 
 
Study  Method  Value of Statistical Life 
Kneisner and Leith (1991)  Labor market  $0.7 million 
Smith and Gilbert (1984)  Labor market  $0.8 million 
Dillingham (1985)  Labor market  1.1 million 
Marin and Psacharopoulos 
(1982) 
Labor market  3.4 million 
V.K. Smith (1976)  Labor market  5.7 million 
Viscusi (1981)  Labor market  7.9 million 
Leigh and Folsom (1984)  Labor market  11.7 million 
Leigh (1987)  Labor market  12.6 million 
Garen (1988)  Labor market  16.3 million 
 
A large advantage of labor market studies of this kind is that they avoid the lively 
disputes over the use of “willingness to pay” or “willingness to accept” in regulatory 
policy.
29 In many contexts, people demand more to give up a good than they are willing 
to pay to obtain it in the first instance – a disparity that much complicates efforts to 
assign monetary values to regulatory benefits, including mortality and morbidity.
30 If 
people are willing to pay $25 to eliminate an existing risk of 1/100,000, but demand $100 
to incur a new risk of 1/100,000, then it is difficult to know how to proceed for purposes 
of monetary valuation of risks. Fortunately, this problem dissipates in the context of labor 
market studies. If workers who face a risk of 1/10,000 are paid $600 more for doing so, 
and if workers who refuse to face such a risk are being paid $600 less, then it is irrelevant 
whether we speak in terms of WTP or WTA.  
Nonetheless, some questions might be raised about the use of these studies by 
EPA and other agencies.
31 Most obviously, the studies show significant variety in the 
crucial numbers, ranging from $0.7 million, in 1997 dollars, to $16.3 million. The EPA 
has adopted the $6.1 million figure on the ground that it represents the median in the 
relevant studies. But there is a risk of arbitrariness in fastening on that median figure, 
certainly if we lack reason to believe that the relevant study is the most accurate. In fact a 
more general look at the VSL data produces further puzzles and wider ranges. Some 
                                                 
29 See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1227 (2003). 
30 See id.; Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences,  Environmental  Law, 22 J. Legal Stud. 217, 246-47 
(1993). 
31  See Parker, supra note, and Robert Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative 




studies find no compensating differentials at all, indicating a VSL of zero
32 -- implausibly 
low, to say the least, for purposes of policy. Others find that non-unionized workers 
receive negative compensating differentials for risk, that is, they appear to be paid less 
because they face mortality risks.
33 Another study finds that African-Americans receive 
no significant compensating wage differential and hence that their particular VSL is 
zero.
34 On the other hand, it is possible to find studies finding a VSL not below the range 
in Table 1 but above it; consider the finding that for people who choose jobs with low 
level risks, the VSL is as much as $22 million.
35  
The most recent meta-study, far more comprehensive than EPA’s own analysis, 
finds that most studies produce a range of between $3.8 million and $9 million.
36 The 
range is fairly compressed, in a way that disciplines agency decisions; for many 
regulations, the “bottom line” of the cost-benefit assessment will not be affected by a 
choice of $3.8 million or $9 million for VSL. But that range still leaves significant room 
for discretion, in a way that would have significant implications for policy and law. 
Consider the fact that the monetized value of a program that saves 200 lives would range 
from $760 million to $1.8 billion; consider also the fact that the EPA’s highly publicized 
arsenic regulation would easily fail cost-benefit analysis with a $3.8 million VSL but 
easily pass with a $9 million VSL.
37 The simple point is that the variety of the outcomes 
raises questions about the reliability of any particular figure. 
In addition, most of these studies on which EPA relies are based on data from the 
1970s. Since that time, there has been significant growth in national income, in a way that 
suggests that any VSL derived from 1970s data is too low. Of course people with more 
money are expected to be willing to pay more, other things being equal, to reduce 
statistical risks. One study finds that at the beginning of the twentieth century, VSL was 
about $150,000 in current dollars -- less than one-twentieth of the corresponding amount 
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38 On reasonable assumptions, the EPA’s use of 1970s data has produced a 
significant undervaluation of the monetary value of the lives at stake, for the $6.1 million 
figure reflects no adjustment to account for changes in national real income growth.
39 In 
principle, the failure to undertake an adjustment is a serious mistake. The actual amount 
might be substantially higher.
40 
Let us suppose that these problems can be solved and that we can identify a 
number, call it $6 million, that really represents people’s valuations. It should be clear 
that even if this were so, it is grossly misleading to offer the following suggestion: The 
value of a statistical life is $6 million. It would be much more accurate to say that for 
risks of 1/10,000, the median WTP, in the relevant population, is $600 -- or that for risks 
of 1/100,000, the median WTP is $60. If true, these statements would, on assumptions to  
be explored, be extremely helpful for purposes of policy.  But even at first glance, we can 
see that these numbers need not be taken to support a VSL that is independent of 
probability.
41 Suppose that people would be willing to pay $60 to reduce a risk of 
1/100,000. From this it does not follow that people would be willing to pay $6 to   
eliminate a risk of 1/1 million, or $6000 to  reduce a risk of /1000, or $60,000 to reduce a 
risk of 1/100. It is plausible to think that people’s WTP to reduce statistical risks is 
nonlinear.
42 As the probability approaches 100%, people become willing to pay an 
amount for risk reduction that arises nonlinearly to 100% of their income; as the risk 
approaches 0%, WTP nonlinearly approaches nothing. For a risk of 1 in 1million, for 
example, many reasonable people would be willing to pay zero, treating that risk as 
inconsequential.  
                                                 
38 See Viscusi and Aldy, supra note, at 22.  
39 EPA has updated the relevant numbers for inflation, but it has not otherwise made adjustments. 
40See Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, The Rising Price of Nonmarket Goods, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 
(Papers & Proc.) 227, 229 tbl.1 (2003) (suggesting likely current value of $12 million). For recent evidence 
that the current numbers are indeed too low, see W. Kip Viscusi, Racial Differences in Labor Market 
Values of a Statistical Life, 27 J. Risk & Uncertainty 239, 252 tbl.5 (2003) [hereinafter Viscusi, Racial 
Differences], finding values as high as $15.1 million in the case of white males.  In the context of arsenic 
regulation, the EPA also noted in its sensitivity analysis that the appropriate adjustment would increase the 
VSL from $6.1 million to $6.7 million. 66 Fed. Reg. at 7012. For recent evidence, suggesting that the 
current VSL is $4.7 for a full sample, $7 million for blue-collar males, and $8.5 for blue-collar females. See 
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(2004). 
41 See Richard Posner, forthcoming book. 




Hence the claim that VSL is $6.1 million is merely a shorthand way of saying that 
people are willing to pay from $600 to $60 to eliminate risks of 1/10,000 to 1/100,000. 
Since this is the range for risks with which most agencies deal, the relevant data is highly 




My basic claim is that VSL will inevitably vary across both risks and persons. If 
people’s WTP is higher to avoid cancer risks than risks of unanticipated, sudden deaths, 
then the use of a VSL, drawn from studies of the latter risks, will ensure insufficient 
protection of the exposed population. If people in different occupations are paid different 
amounts to incur a risk, then use of an uniform VSL will not map onto actual behavior.
43 
If wealthy people show a higher WTP than poor people, then a uniform WTP, based on a 
population-wide median, will ensure insufficient protection of wealthy people and 
excessive protection of poor people – in a way that might well prove harmful to both 
groups.
44 
To test these issues in a preliminary way, I conducted a small contingent valuation 
study. Eighty-four University of Chicago law students were asked about their WTP to 
eliminate each of five risks of 1/100,000. The simplest of these risks involved dying from 
an automobile accident as a result of a defective brake. The four other risks might be 
expected to occasion greater concern; they involved deaths from lung cancer, AIDS, 
Alzheimer’s disease, and dying in an airplane crash as a result of a terrorist attack. The 
1/100,000 risk of dying in an automobile accident produced a mean WTP of $156, 
whereas the four other accidents produced significantly higher amounts (ranging from 
$184 for the AIDS risk to $193 for Alzheimer’s disease). In addition, there was 
substantial heterogeneity across individuals. For each of the questions, about ten 
respondents were willing to pay nothing to eliminate the 1/100,000 risk, producing a VSL 
of 0. And for each of them, about fifteen people were willing to pay at least $500 to 
eliminate the 1/100,000 risk, producing a VSL of $50 million. Let us now turn to the 
possibility of substantial diversity across both risks and persons. 
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I have emphasized that the data that underlies the $6.1 million figure comes from 
risks of accidents in the workplace -- and that even if this data can be generalized, it 
would not justify a probability-independent VSL. But there is a point of greater practical 
importance. A 1/100,000 risk of dying in a workplace accident might well produce a 
different WTP from a 1/100,000 risk of dying of cancer from air pollution, which might 
in turn be different from a 1/100,000 risk of dying in an airplane as a result of a terrorist 
attack, and that number might in turn by different from a 1/100,000 risk of dying as a 
result of a defective snowmobile. The very theory that lies behind the government’s 
current use of VSL justifies a simple conclusion: VSL should be risk-specific; it should 
not be the same across statistically equivalent risks. The use of a single number almost 
certainly produces significant blunders. 
 
1. Data 
Notice initially that the very category of “workplace risks” conceals relevant 
differences. The American economy contains a wide range of occupations and industries, 
and a uniform VSL should not be expected to emerge from each of them. Indeed, a recent 
study finds significant differences across both occupations and industries,
45 with blue-
collar workers showing a higher VSL than others.
46 It is inevitable that a wide range of 
values would emerge from studies that looked separately at machine operators, executive 
positions, sales, dental technicians, equipment cleaners, security guards, and secretaries
47 
– and undoubtedly diverse values could be found within each category.  
In addition, many risks controlled by the EPA are qualitatively different from the 
workplace risks that EPA has used to generate its VSL. Two differences are particularly 
important. First, the workplace studies do not involve cancer, and cancer risks are often 
involved in environmental decisions. There is evidence that the risks associated with 
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cancer produce a higher WTP than other kinds of risk.
48 For example, Hammit and Liu 
find that in Taiwan, willingness to pay to eliminate a cancer risk is about one-third larger 
than WTP to avoid a risk of a similar, chronic degenerative disease.
49 Some contingent 
valuation studies suggest that people are willing to pay twice as much to prevent a cancer 
death as an instantaneous death.
50 People seem to have a special fear of cancer, and they 
seem to be willing to pay more to prevent a cancer death than a sudden unanticipated 
death, or a death from heart disease.
51 The “cancer premium” might be produced by the 
“dread” nature of cancer; it seems well-established that dreaded risks produce special 
social concern, holding the statistical risk constant.
52  
To be sure, existing evidence on this count is not unambiguous. One study of 
occupational exposures does not find a significantly higher VSL for cancer risks.
53 But 
that study assumes that occupational cancers account for 10-20 percent of all cancer 
deaths -- an amount that is almost certainly too high. If occupational exposures account 
for 5% of all cancers – a far more realistic number – then the VSL for cancer risks may 
be as high as $12 million, about double the amount that EPA now uses. The current 
findings conflict
54; but in principle, the VSL figures should be risk-specific, and we know 
enough to suspect that cancer risks produce an unusually high VSL. 
The second difference between workplace risks and the risks that concern EPA is 
that the latter risks seem peculiarly involuntary and uncontrollable.
55 Unlike the risks of 
workplace accidents, pollution risks are not assumed voluntarily in return for 
compensation.
56 A great deal of literature suggests that involuntary, dread, 
uncontrollable, and potentially catastrophic risks produce unusually high levels of public 
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57 If so, the numbers that derive from workplace accidents will substantially 
understate willingness to pay for regulatory benefits provided by the EPA and many other 
agencies as well.
58  
The implications go well beyond the distinction between workplace accidents and 
environmental risks. Some diseases would produce a higher VSL than others. A 
1/100,000 risk of death from Alzheimer's disease, for example, would almost certainly 
produce a higher VSL than 1/100,000 risk of death from a heart attack; 1/50,000 risk of 
an AIDS death would not produce the same VSL as a 1/50,000 risk of death from a 
defective brake system on an automobile; most people would pay more to reduce a risk of 
dying from slow-acting strokes than from strokes that kill outright. There should be a 
distinctive population-wide median VSL for mortality risks of airplane accidents, of 
cancer from air pollution, of motor vehicle accidents, of defective toys, of cancer from 
water pollution. In fact studies have been done for seatbelt use, automobile safety, home 
fire detectors, and more, and they find a wide variety of numbers, with a VSL ranging 
from $770,000 (smoke detectors, based on data in the 1970s) to $9.9 million (fatality 
risks associated with safety belts and motorcycle helmets).
59 And within each of these 
categories, further distinctions would undoubtedly emerge. All cancer fatalities are not 
the same; informed people would surely make distinctions between those that involve 
long periods of suffering and those that do not. If we are really interested in basing VSL 
on WTP, a uniform number, treating all statistically identical mortality risks as the same, 
is fatally obtuse. 
 
2. Practice 
These claims are not entirely foreign to current regulatory policy. In the context of 
arsenic regulation, the EPA was alert to some of them.
60 Hence its own sensitivity 
analysis for arsenic suggested the need for an upward revision of 7%, because of the 
involuntariness and uncontrollability of the risk.
61 With this revision, along with the 
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revision for income growth, the value of a statistical life would rise from $6.1 million to 
$7.2 million.
62 In fact there are reasons to suggest that this amount might be far too low. 
Dean Revesz suggeststhat “the value of avoiding a death from an involuntary, 
carcinogenic risk should be estimated as four times as large as the value of avoiding an 
instantaneous workplace fatality.”
63 If we take this approach, the VSL, in the context of 
arsenic, jumps from $6.1 million to $24.3 million. I am not arguing that $24.3 million is 
the correct number; I am suggesting only that VSL is almost certainly risk-specific. 
 
3. Qualifications 
Three qualifications are important. First, psychological studies about heightened 
public concern
64 may not translate into higher WTP. Social scientists might be able to 
show that certain qualitative factors make people especially concerned about certain 
risks, but it is an independent question whether and how much WTP increase as a result. 
Fortunately, a number of studies of WTP contain at least suggestive answers to that 
question, demonstrating that VSL does vary significantly across areas.
65  
Second, it is important not to think that there is a rigid dichotomy between the 
involuntary/uncontrollable and the voluntary/controllable.
66 This is a continuum, without 
sharp divisions among various points. Are the risks from air pollution in Los Angeles 
involuntarily incurred? The answer might seem to be affirmative, but people have a 
choice whether or not to live in Los Angeles. Are the risks of airplane travel 
uncontrollable? Many people think so, but the decision to fly is itself under human 
control. Death from an asteroid seems to be a model case of involuntariness, at an 
opposite pole from hang-gliding. But why?  In deciding whether a risk is faced 
involuntarily, or whether it is within personal control, the underlying issues seem to be 
whether those exposed to the risk are exposed knowingly and whether it is costly or 
otherwise difficult for people to avoid the risk.
67 When risks are approached in these 
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terms, it is clear that some risks are worse than others, even if the probability of harm is 
identical. This point is enough to suggest that VSL cannot be uniform across risks.  
  Third, it is possible that extreme aversion to certain risks reflects a form of 
bounded rationality
68 -- and hence it is possible to doubt whether that extreme aversion 
should be allowed to play a role in regulatory policy. Suppose, for example, that people 
really are willing to pay twice as much to avoid a cancer risk as to avoid a sudden, 
unanticipated death. Must these numbers be decisive for purposes of policy, assuming 
that the contingent valuation study is reliable? They might not be if we have reason to 
believe that the WTP figures are not accurately measuring welfare.  And is it even 
plausible to think that the “cancer premium” is so high that it actually doubles the cost of 
death?  Is it reasonable to think that a death from cancer is actually twice as bad as a 
death that is sudden and unanticipated?  To be sure, a degree of pain and suffering 
typically accompanies cancer, and this point helps explain the obtuseness of using the 
same number for cancer risks as for risks of sudden, unanticipated deaths. But it is not 
easy to defend the set of (exotic) values that would lead to the conclusion that the 
relevant pain and suffering is as bad as death itself. If WTP is not measuring welfare 
here, and if the inflated numbers for cancer deaths are a product of an intuitive recoil or 
terror at the idea of cancer, then regulators might not use the unrealistically high 
monetary values. To be least controversial, WTP numbers would reflect informed rather 
than reflexive judgments about the nature of the harms involved. 
 
B. Persons 
Even when risks are identical, people are heterogeneous in their values and their 
preferences. The $6.1 million itself is the median figure – it is the median of a set of 
means. But everyone agrees that in workplaces and elsewhere, individual WTP is highly 
variable. Some of the variability stems from different degrees of aversion to different 
risks. Some people are especially concerned to avoid the dangers associated with 
pesticides, whereas others focus on the risks of air travel; some of these differences are a 
product of beliefs (about existing risk levels) and others of tastes and values. WTP and 
hence VSL will also vary in accordance with both wealth and bargaining power. So too, 
                                                 




those with high levels of background risk should be expected to be willing to pay less to 
avoid an additional risk of 1/100,000 than those with low levels of background risk. If a 
relevant population faces thirty annual mortality risks of 1/10,000 or higher, it should be 
expected to show a lower VSL with respect to a new risk of 1/100,000 than a population 
whose background risks are less serious.
69 The difference between the VSL of people in 
wealthy nations and that of people in poor nations, taken up below, is partly a product of 
the fact that the latter group generally faces far higher background risks. 
Equally fundamentally, those with little to spare will show a far lower VSL than 
those who have plenty. WTP depends on ability to pay (ATP), and when ATP is low, 
WTP will of course be low as well, holding preferences constant. For this reason the VSL 
of people with an annual income of $50,000 will be lower than that of people with an 
annual income of $150,000. People in the former category might be willing to pay no 
more than $25 to reduce a risk of 1/100,000, where people in the latter group might be 
willing to pay as much as $100. If so, government should not require everyone to pay 
$100; its decision to do so would harm those unwilling to pay that amount.
70 A uniform 
VSL, of the sort that government now uses, threatens to “overprotect” the poor, in a way 
that might well be harmful to them – and also threatens to underprotect the wealthy, in a 
way that is highly likely to be harmful to them.
71 
As a simple matter of fact, we would expect that unionized workers would receive 
more compensation for incurring risks – and studies almost always show a higher VSL 
for unionized workers, with amounts found to be as high as $12.3 million, $18.1 million, 
and even $44.2 million.
72 We would expect to find large differences across nations, with 
VSL being higher in rich countries than in poor ones. And in fact, studies find a VSL as 
low as $200,000 for Taiwan, $500,000 for South Korea, and $1.2 million for India -- but 
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$21.7 million for Canada and $19 million for Australia.
73 Consider, for purposes of 







Table 3: VSL Across Nations 
 
Nation and year of study  VSL (in 2000 US$) 
  
Japan (1991)  $9.7 million 
South Korea (1993)  $0.8 million 
Canada (1989)  $3.9-4.7 million 
India (1996/97)  $1.2-1.5 million 
Taiwan (1997)  $0.2-0.9 million 
Australia (1997)  $11.3-19.1 million 
Hong Kong (1998)  $1.7 million 
Switzerland (2001)  $6.3–8.6 million 
United Kingdom (2000)  $19.9 million 
 
 
It would follow that within the United States, wealthy populations would show a 
higher VSL than poorer populations. If a program is designed to combat health risks in 
wealthy suburbs, the VSL would be above the population-wide median; if the protected 
population is mostly in poor areas, the VSL would be below it. Currently agencies pay no 
attention to this possibility in undertaking cost-benefit analysis.
75 
It is likely that WTP varies with respect to age as well. We might well predict that 
other things being equal, older people will show a lower WTP and hence a lower VSL, 
simply because they have fewer years left. One study, for example, finds that the VSL of 
a 48-year-old is 10 percent lower than that of a 36-year-old; another finds that people 
under 45 has a VSL twenty times higher than people over 65.
76 The most careful analysis 
suggests that VSL peaks around age thirty, stays constant for about a decade, but declines 
from that point, so much so that the VSL for a 60-year old is approximately half of that of 
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people from thirty to forty.
77 These findings raise particular conundrums in the case of 
people under eighteen, including children; how should government proceed if the VSL 
for those between infancy and fifteen years of age show a tiny VSL, simply because they 
have little or no money? It is implausible to use a tiny VSL for them; but what number 
should be used, and why? Little progress has been made on this question,
78 with the 
government using its ordinary, uniform number for children as for everyone else.
79 But if 
we put the vexing case of valuing children to one side, then the prevailing theory suggests 
a lower VSL for those at the last stages of life than for those who have many decades to 
go – and that this difference ought to be reflected in regulatory policy.
80 
Along the same lines, many analysts have suggested that regulatory policy should 
focus not on statistical lives but on statistical life-years (VSLY).
81 Suppose that they are 
right. If so, then the statistical lives of young people are likely to be worth more than the 
statistical lives of older people. The government’s interest in focusing on VSLY led to 
widespread public objections to what, under one proposal, would seem to be a “senior 
death discount” -- in accordance with which someone over seventy would be “worth” 58 
cents on the dollar.
82 But assuming that people over 70 are willing to pay about 58%, on 
average, of what people under 70 are willing to pay, the theory that underlies current 
practice justifies exactly this disparity. If the theory is right (a question to which I will 
turn), then a disparity between older people and younger people make perfect sense to the 
extent that the WTP figures justify it. 
What about the more controversial categories of race and gender? Recent studies 
show significant differences. Using workplace data from 1996 to 1998, Leeth and Ruser 
find that women’s VSL ranges from $8.1 million to $10.2 million, whereas men’s VSL is 
less than half that, ranging from $2.6 million to $4.7 million.
83  Leeth and Ruser find that 
Hispanic males show a slightly higher VSL than white males ($5 million to $3.4 
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84 – and most strikingly, that African-Americans receive no compensation for 
workplace risks, producing a VSL of 0.
85 Using workplace data from 1992 through 1997, 
Viscusi also finds a significant disparity across racial lines, though his numbers are quite 
different from those found by Leeth and Ruser.
86  In Viscusi’s study, the VSL is highest 
for white males and lowest for African-American males, with white females and African-
Americans falling between the poles. More particularly, Viscusi finds that the overall 
white VSL is $15 million, while the overall African-American VSL is $7.2 million.
87 For 
white females, the overall VSL is $9.4 million, compared to $18.8 million for white 
males; for African-American females, the overall VSL is $6.9 million, compared to $5.9 
million for African-American males. Another study by Viscusi finds a VSL of $7 million 
for blue-collar males and $8.5 million for blue-collar females.
88 The differences between 
Leeth and Ruser on the one hand and Viscusi on the other remains a puzzle. For my 
purposes, the central point is that demographic differences in VSL are entirely to be 
expected, and they are found in both studies.  
 
C. Theory and Practice 
If we put the foregoing points together, we can see that there is not one VSL, but 
an exceptionally large number of VSLs. In fact each of us has not one VSL but a number 
of them, targeted to each risk that each of us faces. A policy that truly tracks WTP would 
seek to provide each person with the level of protection for which he is willing to pay to 
reduce each risk. Tracking WTP is the goal that underlies current practice; and apart from 
questions of administrability, it calls for a maximum level of individuation.  
As a thought experiment, suppose that an all-knowing regulator could costlessly 
determine each person’s WTP for each statistical risk that she faces – and perfectly match 
the level of regulatory protection to that WTP. In these circumstances, the regulator 
should give each person no more and no less than his WTP for each risk that he faces. (In 
cases in which people’s WTP is low because they are poor, they might be subsidized; but 
they would not be forced to purchase goods for an amount in excess of their WTP. 
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Subsidies are not my topic here.) Under this approach, regulatory benefits would be 
treated the same as every other commodity that is traded on markets, including safety 
itself. Of course most people face extremely serious problems in dealing with risk, 
stemming both from an absence of information and from bounded rationality.
89 The all-
knowing regulator would overcome these problems and provide people with what they 
would want if they did not suffer from them. If we could do this, then the current theory 
would be perfectly implemented. If so, it would follow that overall WTP would be lower 
for poor people than for wealthy people, for African-Americans than for whites, and 
(possibly) for men than for women. But under this thought experiment, government 
would not discriminate against any group by deciding (for example) on a high VSL for 
programs with 95% whites and a lower VSL for programs with 55% African-Americans. 
The difference would be a product of aggregations of fully individual VSL – 
aggregations of the kind that the most conventional markets, including those for 
consumer goods, now provide.  
Of course there are two practical problems with taking the thought experiment 
seriously. The first is that we do not know the WTP of every individual, and as a practical 
matter, it is not possible to find out. The second problem is that regulatory benefits are 
often collective goods – goods that cannot feasibly be provided to one without also being 
provided to many. In the context of air pollution, for example, it is not possible to provide 
cleaner air for some without providing cleaner air for many or all. In regulating air 
pollution and water pollution, individuation is simply not an option.  
These problems are fatal objections to full individuation. But they are not fatal 
objections to more individuation.  At a minimum, agencies should be encouraged to take 
account of existing research in their sensitivity analyses, which would result (for 
example) in increased “upper bound” estimates for cancer risks.
90 In addition, disparities 
in VSL findings might be mapped onto different agency estimates, producing reasonable 
rather than arbitrary differences across agencies. If, for example, the risks of death from 
workplace accidents produce a lower number than the risks of death from consumer 
products, then the Occupational Safety and Health Administration might have a lower 
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VSL than the Consumer Product Safety Administration. We could easily imagine a 
research program in which the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs attempts to 
elicit far more information on VSL across different risks. A movement in this direction 
need not raise troubling ethical questions.  
Much more controversially, agencies might also adopt different VSLs depending 
on whether the affected population is especially wealthy or especially poor. At the very 
least, agencies should adjust VSL to changes in national wealth over time, producing a 
higher amount than would come from inflation adjustments alone.
91 Or suppose, for 
example, that a regulation is designed to protect migrant farmworkers, expected to show 
a low VSL. Current studies in fact estimate the relationship between income and VSL,
92 
allowing agencies to make suitable adjustments. And when the population is relatively 
wealthy, the agency might adopt a higher VSL. For present purposes, I am suggesting 
only that an approach of this kind is indicated by the theory that government now uses. I 
will turn in Part IV to the larger questions that such an approach would make it necessary 
to answer. 
The larger question is simple: What is the optimal level of individuation with 
respect to the value of life? The answer depends in part on how much we know. Even in 
markets, individuals are not usually asked, and charged, their particular WTP. In real 
estate markets, negotiation between individuals is the usual practice. But for ordinary 
consumer goods – cereal, soap, casebooks, subscription of law reviews – a standard price 
emerges from the forces of supply and demand. It seems clear that a uniform value of 
life, cutting across domains in which those forces almost certainly establish disparate 
amounts, fits poorly with the theory that currently underlies government practice. It is 
also clear that full individuation is not feasible. The appropriate intermediate approach 
depends on two familiar variables: the costs of decisions and the costs of errors. As better 
information emerges about different VSLs across risks and persons, the use of a uniform 
number will be increasingly difficult to support. And if those differences are substantial, 
the argument for further differentiation will be strengthened. We might see a uniform 
number as a plausible “first generation” response to the problems posed by cost-benefit 
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analysis. The second generation is now well underway, and hence finer distinctions will 
be increasingly hard to resist. 
 
D. Administrative Law 
How do these points bear on the legality of agency action? Courts have started to 
develop principles by which to review agency decisions about how to assess the costs and 
benefits of regulation.
93 Some statutes explicitly require agencies to balance costs against 
benefits, and under such statutes the agency’s choices about valuation might be 
challenged as unreasonable or arbitrary.
94 If an agency used a VSL of $200,000, it would 
almost certainly be assigning an arbitrarily and hence unlawfully low monetary value; if 
it used a VSL of $40 million, its selection would be arbitrary high.
95 In all cases the 
agency is required to produce a reasonable explanation for why it has proceeded one way 
rather than another.
96 
In view of the arguments made thus far, we could easily imagine legal challenges 
to agency decisions. Suppose that the EPA continues to use the $6.1 million figure, based 
on workplace studies. The agency’s decision would be vulnerable on several grounds. 
First, it might be too low in light of the growth in national income. Second, it fails to 
account for evidence that pollution risks, especially if cancer is involved, produce a 
higher VSL than workplace risks. Third, it does not, on the facts stated, come to terms 
with the possibility that the protected group is wealthier or poorer than the group 
involved in the workplace studies. All of these challenges are plausible under existing 
law. As new and better data emerge, they become stronger still. It is highly likely than a 
decade from now, the use of a uniform figure will seem obtuse, even indefensible. 
Is there anything than agencies might say in response? They might urge that the 
existing evidence is too ambiguous and contestable to justify a change in current practice. 
Some studies based on more recent data find a VSL in the range of $6.1 million.
97 With 
respect to cancer, EPA’s Science Advisory Board (SAB) rejected an upward revision for 
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especially dread illnesses, finding that the existing literature does not justify any such 
revision; and some evidence directly supports the view of the SAB.
98 To be sure, it is 
more than plausible to think that VSL is wealth-dependent; but EPA might urge that a 
uniform number is morally preferable and not greatly out of line with existing evidence. 
In any case, a single number might have the advantage of easy administrability -- and 
produce results that in general would be the same as those produced by imaginable 
variations. Most of the time, the agency’s choice will not be affected if it selects a VSL of 
$3.5 million or $10 million; if so, a uniform number would seem acceptable.  
In many cases, I believe that these responses are unconvincing as a matter of 
policy. But in light of the properly limited role of courts in the oversight of agency action, 
they are convincing as a matter of law.
99 Courts should allow agencies considerable room 
to maneuver here, at least until the evidence against a uniform number becomes 
overwhelming. Permission to adopt such a number has an important corollary: An agency 
would be on firm legal ground if it attempted to make adjustments of the sort I have 
suggested, even if current evidence does not unambiguously support those adjustments. 
 
4. Why WTP? Easy Cases, Hard Cases 
 
Thus far I have assumed that the theory behind current practice is straightforward 
– that it depends on an empirical elicitation of people’s WTP as the foundation for VSL. 
If the assumption is correct, then a high degree of individuation is justified. But perhaps 
the assumption is false. Perhaps the prevailing theory does rely on elicited WTP, but also 
adopts a norm in favor of the equality of persons (and possibly risks as well).
100 Might 
that more complex theory be correct? In any case, what is the argument for embodying 
people’s actual WTP in regulatory policy? Why should anyone care about actual WTP at 
all? Why should government conduct cost-benefit analysis with close reference to 
VSL
101? 
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A. Easy Cases 
Let us begin with easy cases. For the sake of simplicity, assume a society in 
which people face multiple risks of 1/100,000, and in which every person is both 
adequately informed and willing to pay no more and no less than $60 to eliminate each of 
those risks. Assume too that the cost of eliminating these 1/100,000 risks is widely 
variable, ranging from close to zero to many billions. Assume finally that the cost of 
eliminating any risk is borne entirely by those who benefit from risk elimination. Under 
that assumption, regulation imposes the equivalent of user’s fee; for example, people’s 
water bills will entirely reflect the costs of a policy that eliminates a 1/100,000 of getting 
cancer from arsenic in drinking water.  If the per-person cost is $100, each water bill will 
be increased by exactly that amount. 
 
1. The straightforward argument 
With these assumptions, the argument for using WTP is straightforward. 
Regulation amounts to a forced exchange; it tells people that they must purchase certain 
benefits for a certain amount. Why should government force people to pay for things that 
they do not want? By hypothesis, a forced exchange on terms that people dislike will 
make them worse off. The case for using WTP depends on the simple idea that 
government should make Pareto-superior moves (those that make at least one person 
better off without making anyone worse off) and that it should avoid making Pareto-
inferior moves (those that make at least one person worse off without making anyone 
better off). At first glance, use of WTP and VSL, on the assumptions I am making, seems 
hard to contest.
102 
  Consider how this argument works with respect to risks and persons. Suppose that 
people are willing to pay no more than $50 to avoid a 1/100,000 risk of dying in an car 
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crash, but they are willing up to $100 to avoid a 1/100,000 risk of dying of cancer. If 
government uses a WTP for both risks of $75, it will force people to pay more than they 
want to avoid the risks associated with airplane crashes, and less than they want to avoid 
risks of cancer. Why should government do that? And if the argument is convincing in 
this example, it should apply in numerous cases in which WTP and VSL vary across 
risks. 
  With respect to persons, the argument is more controversial, above all because it 
treats poor people as less valuable (literally) than poor people. But at least at first glance, 
differences are appropriate here as well. The reason is not that poor people are less 
valuable than rich people. It is that no one, rich or poor, should be forced to pay more 
than they are willing to pay for the reduction of risks. This idea embodies a norm of 
equality. And if poor people are unwilling to pay much for the reduction of serious risks, 
the appropriate response is not a compelled purchase, but a subsidy. Suppose, for 
example, that each member of a group of relatively poor people, earning less than 
$30,000 annually, is willing to pay only $25 to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000 – about one-
half, let us suppose, of the nation’s population-wide median of $50. Should regulators 
require every citizen, including those in the relatively poor group, to pay $50? In 
principle, the government should force exchanges only on terms that people find 
acceptable, at least if it is genuinely concerned with their welfare.  
  Does the easy case seem implausibly unrealistic? In many contexts, it certainly is. 
The costs of air pollution regulation are not fully borne by its beneficiaries.
103 But for 
workers’ compensation regulation, the situation is very different: Nonunionized workers 
faced a dollar-for-dollar wage reduction, corresponding almost perfectly to the expected 
value of the benefits they received.
104 For drinking water regulation, something similar is 
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There are several possible objections. They point to some important 
qualifications, but none of them is a convincing refutation of the straightforward 
argument. 
(a) Adaptive preferences and “miswanting.” The first objection would emphasize 
the possibility that people’s preferences have adapted to existing opportunities, including 
deprivation.
106 Perhaps people show a low WTP for environmental goods, including 
health improvements, simply because they have adjusted to environmental bads, 
including health risks. Perhaps people’s WTP reflects an effort to reduce cognitive 
dissonance through the conclusion that risks are lower than they actually are.
107 To 
generalize the objection, perhaps people suffer from a problem of “miswanting”
108; they 
want things that do not promote their welfare, and they do not want things that would 
promote their welfare. If this is so, then WTP loses much of its underlying justification; 
people’s decisions do not actually promote their welfare.
109 And if government can be 
confident that people are not willing to pay for goods from which they would greatly 
benefit, then government should abandon WTP.  
In some contexts, this objection raises serious problems for neoclassical 
economics and for unambivalent enthusiasm for freedom of choice. But in the context of 
ordinary regulatory policy, this objection has more theoretical than practical interest. 
Typically we are speaking here of steps that would reduce low level risks (say, 1/50,000) 
and here there is no reason to believe that the use of informed WTP (say, $100) is a 
product of adaptive preferences. 
(b) Inadequate information and bounded rationality. A closely related objection 
would point to an absence of information and to bounded rationality. People have a 
notoriously difficult time in dealing with low-probability events.
110 If people are not 
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aware of what they might be gaining by regulation, their WTP might be too low. And if 
people are unable to understand the meaning of ideas like “1 in 50,000,” or to respond 
rationally to such ideas, then there are serious problems with relying on WTP. In 
imaginable circumstances, this is a serious difficulty for the use of WTP and VSL. 
Perhaps people’s WTP reflects excessive discounting of future health benefits; if workers 
are ignoring the future, or applying an implausibly high discount rate, then there is a good 
argument for putting their WTP to one side.  
By hypothesis, however, there is no such problem here. We are dealing with cases 
in which WTP is a result of adequate information and in which bounded rationality is not 
leading people to err. In any case the relevant numbers come from contingent valuation 
studies or market evidence in which decisions are adequately informed. If not, 
appropriate adjustments should be made. 
(c) Rights. A quite different objection would point to people’s rights. Perhaps 
people have a right not to be subjected to risks of a certain magnitude, and the use of 
WTP will violate those rights. And it does seem fully reasonable to say that whatever 
their WTP, human beings should have a right not to be subject to risks above a particular 
level. Imagine, for example, that poor people live in a place where they face a 1/20 
annual risk of dying from water pollution; it makes sense to say that the government 
should reduce that risk even if people are willing to pay only $1 to eliminate it and the 
per-person cost is $100.
111  
As an abstract claim about people’s rights, the objection is correct. Something has 
gone badly wrong if people are exposed to serious risks and if their WTP prevents them, 
or their government, from doing anything in response. But the objection has little force 
against the particular argument I am making. The initial problem is that in the cases under 
discussion, rights of this kind are usually not involved; we are speaking here of 
statistically small risks. Suppose that this response is unconvincing and that rights are 
indeed involved. If so, there is a still more fundamental point. When rights are involved, 
the proper response is not to force people to buy protection that they do not want, but to 
provide a subsidy that will give them the benefit for free or enable them to receive the 
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benefit at what is, for them, an acceptable price.
112 Nothing here is meant to deny the 
possibility that government should provide certain goods via subsidy, or indeed that 
subjection to risks above a certain level is a violation of rights.
113 The question here is 
one of regulation under the stated assumptions. So long as that is the question, use of 
WTP does not violate anyone’s rights. 
(d) Democracy vs. markets. An independent objection would stress that people 
are citizens, not merely consumers; it would urge that regulatory choices should be made 
after citizens have deliberated with one another about preferences and values.
114 The 
argument against forced exchanges treats people as consumers; it sees their decisions 
about safety as the same as those about all other commodities. For some decisions, this 
approach is badly misconceived. Our constitutional system is a deliberative 
democracy,
115 not a maximization machine, and many social judgments should be made 
by citizens engaged in deliberative discussion with one another rather than by 
aggregating the individual choices of consumers.
116  
In the context of racial and sex discrimination, for example, the legal system does 
not aggregate people’s WTP; the level of discrimination is not set by using market 
evidence or contingent valuation studies to see how much people would be willing to pay 
to discriminate (or to be free from discrimination). Through political processes, citizens 
have decided that certain forms of discrimination are illicit, whatever people’s WTP. The 
protection of endangered species might be understood in similar terms. On reasonable 
assumptions, it would make little sense to aggregate people’s willingness to pay in 
deciding whether and when to protect members of endangered species; this is a moral 
question to be resolved through democratic discussion, not through exercises in consumer 
sovereignty. The question of animal welfare is closely analogous. Laws that forbid 
cruelty to animals, and that impose affirmative duties of protection on human beings, 
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stem not from anything involving WTP, but from a belief that moral commitments call 
for them.
117 Thus Amartya Sen emphasizes that “discussions and exchange, and even 
political arguments, contribute to the formation and revision of values,”
118 and urges that 
in the particular context of environmental protection, solutions require us “to go beyond 
looking only for the best reflection of existing individual preferences, or the most 
acceptable procedures for choices based on those preferences.”
119 
These claims are both fundamental and correct; but it is important not to read 
them for more than they are worth. In trading off safety and health in our own private 
lives, we do not have static values and preferences. Much of the time, our choices are a 
product of reflection, even if we are simply acting as consumers. Reflection and 
deliberation, including reflection and deliberation with others, is not absent from the 
market domain. To be sure, moral questions are not to be resolved by aggregating private 
willingness to pay. Sometimes people’s preferences, though backed by WTP, are morally 
off-limits; sometimes people are not willing to pay for goods that have strong moral 
justifications. In these circumstances, the market model is inapplicable. But do these 
arguments suggest that government should override individual choices about how much 
to spend to eliminate low-level risks, even when those choices are adequately informed? 
For environmental protection generally, it is indeed important to go beyond “the best 
reflection of existing individual preferences.” But this point does not mean that people 
should be required to pay (say) $100 to eliminate risks of 1/100,000 when they are 
willing to pay only $75.  
If people’s WTP reflects an absence of information or insufficient deliberation, 
then it is important for other people, in government as elsewhere, to draw their attention 
to that fact. And in some cases, a low WTP might be overridden on the ground that it is 
rooted in errors, factual or otherwise. But these points should not be taken as a general 
objection to governmental reluctance to force people to reduce statistical risks at an 
expense that they deem excessive. Here is one way to understand the argument I am 
making: Ours is a deliberative democracy, to be sure, but in that democracy, it is valuable 
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for regulators to consider more fully individuated VSLs in deciding how to proceed, at 
least under the stated assumptions.  
(e) Very low probabilities and catastrophic risks. Suppose that everyone in the 
United States faces an annual death risk of 1/10,000,000 – and that the risk, if it comes to 
fruition, will kill every person in the country. The expected number of annual deaths is 
26, which would produce expected annual costs in excess of $158 million, assuming a 
VSL of $6.1 million. But if we attempt to elicit each individual’s WTP to avoid a risk of 
1/10,000,000, we might well produce a number very close to zero – yielding both 26 
expected annual fatalities and expected annual costs very close to zero. This seems to be 
an anomaly; is it really sensible to conclude that the prevention of 26 deaths is worth 
nothing? A fully ex ante perspective, based on people’s WTP to avoid very low 
probability risks, suggests an affirmative answer. But assigning a value near zero, for the 
prevention of dozens of deaths, seems quite implausible. In cases of this kind, we seem to 
find a serious problem with the ex ante perspective on VSL. 
This conclusion understates the problem. In the case at hand, the risk is 
potentially catastrophic; if the 1/10,000,000 chance comes through, every American will 
be dead. Even if people show a WTP near zero to avoid a risk of that size, it does not 
seem right to think that the nation should spend almost nothing to prevent it.
120 The point 
has a general bearing on precautions against low probability risks of catastrophe: Some 
degree of prevention is justified even if WTP numbers do not justify them. Part of the 
problem with those numbers is that if individual behavior is consulted, it will not reflect a 
“catastrophe premium” or “extermination premium” that would almost certainly emerge 
if it were possible to test for it. But part of the problem may be that WTP is not an 
adequate measure of social responses to catastrophes, perhaps because people are not 
familiar with making choices about risks of that sort. 
I believe that this objection is sound to the use of a (low or near-zero) VSL in the 
context of catastrophic risks, even if the WTP numbers justify that VSL. But this is an 
extremely limited objection; it does not apply to the overwhelming number of cases in 
which VSL is used.   
                                                 




(f) Third party effects. A final objection would point to effects on third parties. If 
outsiders would be adversely affected, and if their welfare is not being considered, then 
the WTP calculus is incomplete. This point creates a general problem for WTP as it is 
currently used: Agencies consider people’s WTP to eliminate statistical risks, without 
taking account of the fact that others – especially family members and close friends – 
would also be willing to pay something to eliminate those risks. John might be willing to 
pay $25 to eliminate his own risk of 1/100,000, but his wife Jane might be willing to pay 
$25 to eliminate John’s risk too; if we add the WTP, on John’s behalf, of John’s friends 
and relatives, the total WTP might soon exceed $100. This point is a serious problem for 
existing uses of WTP.  
But we are stipulating that there are no third party effects here. The argument for 
using WTP, on the stated assumptions, is that government should not force people to buy 
goods that are not worthwhile for them. At least at first glance, this argument seems 
sound with respect to statistical risks of the kind on which I am focusing here.
121  
 
B. WTP and Easy Cases: Demographic Differences, International Differences 
 
1. Rich and poor 
Suppose that poor people are willing to pay only $20 to eliminate a statistical risk 
of 1/100,000, but that wealthy people are willing to pay $60. It would follow that the 
VSL would be lower for poor people than for wealthy people – and that a regulatory 
policy that focuses on WTP would provide a higher VSL for wealthy people ($6 million) 
than for poor people ($2 million). Is this unjust or unfair to poor people? On the current 
assumptions, it is not. Government should not force poor people to buy more than their 
WTP to eliminate statistical risks; forced exchanges of this kind do poor people no good 
and some harm. It is tempting to justify a uniform VSL, one that does not distinguish 
between rich and poor, on the ground that it embodies a form of risk equity, treating 
every person as no more and no less than one
122 and redistributing resources in the 
direction of poor people. But this is an error. A uniform WTP, taken (let us suppose) 
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from a population-wide median, does not produce redistribution toward the poor, any 
more than any other kind of forced exchange.  Government does not require people to 
buy Volvos, even though Volvos would reduce statistical risks. A uniform VSL has some 
of the same characteristics as a policy that requires people to buy Volvos. 
2. Rich countries, poor countries 
The point has significant implications for global risk regulation. I have suggested 
that people in poor nations show a lower VSL than people in wealthy nations.
123 Building 
on evidence of this kind, some assessments of the effects of global warming find far 
higher monetized costs from deaths of people in rich countries than from deaths of people 
in poor countries.
124 In its Second Report in 1995, the International Panel on Climate 
Change calculated that a life in an industrialized country was worth $1.5 million, while a 
life in a developing country was worth only $150,000.
125  These assessments have been 
highly controversial; John Broome, for example, notes that under this approach, an 
American life is worth 10 or 20 Indian lives, a judgment that he deems “absurd.”
126 
Hence some analysts, including the International Panel, have opted for a world-wide VSL 
of $1 million, a choice that seems quite arbitrary and potentially harmful to people in rich 
nations and poor ones alike.  
(a) Abstract values? How should global institutions assess the monetary value of 
human lives? What are the monetized costs of (say) 10,000 worldwide deaths from global 
warming, deaths that include (say) 8000 people from poor countries and 2000 from 
wealthy ones? There is no sensible abstract answer to these questions; we have to know 
what, in particular, the answer is for. If a general question is asked, outside of any 
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particular context, about the monetary value of a stated number of deaths in 2020, it is 
best unanswered (except with laughter).  The appropriate assessments of VSL, and 
variations across countries, depend on their intended use. If disparate numbers are meant 
to identify the actual monetary values of human lives, and to suggest that people in 
Canada are “worth” much more than people in Argentina, they are ludicrous as well as 
offensive. And if disparate numbers are meant to suggest the appropriate amount that 
donor institutions should spend to reduce mortality risks, they make little sense. The fact 
that a poor person in a poor nation would be willing to pay $1 to eliminate a risk of 
1/10,000, whereas a wealthy person in a wealthy nation would be willing to pay $100, 
cannot plausibly be used to defend the view that an international agency should devote its 
resources to the latter rather than the former.  
To see the point: Suppose that you are asked to choose between two programs: 
 
(A) Program A would eliminate (at a stated cost to you of $500) a 1/10,000 risk 
faced by fifty poor people in Costa Rica, each willing to pay $2 to eliminate 
that risk. 
(B) Program B would eliminate (also at a stated cost of $500) a 1/10,000 risk 
faced by fifty wealthy people in Berlin, each willing to pay $350 to eliminate 
that same risk.  
 
            In  principle,  there  is  no  reason to think that you should prefer to save the 
Berliners, even those their VSL is far higher. In fact Program A has much higher priority, 
because it would help people who are facing extreme deprivation. What is true at the 
individual level is true across nations as well.  
(b) VSL in poor countries. But imagine that the government in a poor nation is 
deciding on appropriate policy to reduce workplace risks. At least under the assumptions 
I have given thus far, such a government would do well to begin by using the admittedly 
low WTP of its own citizens. If citizens in that nation show a WTP of $2 to eliminate 
risks of 1/10,000, then their government does them no favors by requiring them to pay 
$50 or $10. This is the sense in which VSL properly varies across nations, and in which 
citizens of poor nations have a lower VSL than citizens of wealthy ones. The point has 
strong implications for international labor standards. It is tempting to suggest that 




protection as those in the United States; why should a worker in Beijing be subject to 
significantly higher death risks than a worker in Los Angeles?  
As a matter of basic principle, there is no good answer to this question. But as a 
matter of regulatory policy, the answer is straightforward. So long as the distribution of 
global income has the form that it does, a system that gives Chinese workers the same 
protection as American workers is not in the interest of Chinese workers – assuming, as 
we are, that the cost of that protection is borne by workers themselves. Requiring Chinese 
workers to have the same protection as Americans amounts to a forced exchange on 
terms that Chinese workers reject. The idea that workers in poor nations should have the 
“same” protection as workers in wealthy nations is an error, rooted in a moral heuristic 
involving the equal worth of all human lives – a heuristic that sometimes works well but 
that also misfires.
127 
Note, once again, that the argument for using WTP does not imply satisfaction 
with the existing distribution of wealth.  We might believe that the existing distribution is 
unjust and that it should be dramatically changed. The problem with forced exchanges is 
that they do nothing to alter existing distributions. In fact they make poor people worse 
off, requiring them to use their limited resources for something that they do not want to 
buy. 
 
C. Harder Cases: Kaldor-Hicks and Welfare 
There is an obvious artificiality in the assumptions thus far. Most important, 
people do not always bear the full social costs of the regulatory benefits they receive.  
Sometimes they pay only a fraction of those costs – or possibly even nothing at all. When 
this is so, the normative analysis is much more complicated. In the context of air 
pollution regulation, for example, there is a complex set of distributional effects, and on 
balance, poor people, and members of minority communities, appear to be net gainers.
128 
An efficiency analysis, based on WTP, might not produce an adequate account of the 
welfare effects of air pollution regulation. And even if it does, an account of welfare 
effects might not end the normative question, because the distributional gains are 
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129 The difficulty is that a high VSL, one that exceeds what WTP 
studies show for poor people, might produce outcomes that are in the best interest of poor 
people, in the sense that the result is a welfare improvement for them.
130 Note that these 
points do not bear directly on the question whether VSL should vary across risks. But 
they do bear on the issue of varying VSL across persons, and in particular across 
differences that result from disparities in income and wealth. 
Suppose, for example, that beneficiaries of a proposed drinking water regulation 
are willing to pay only $80 to eliminate a risk of 1/80,000 in drinking water; that the per-
person cost of eliminating a 1/50,000 risk is $100; but that for every dollar of that cost, 
the beneficiaries pay only 80 cents. The remaining 20 cents might be paid by water 
companies themselves, in the form of reduced profits, or by employees of the water 
companies, in the form of reduced wages and fewer jobs. In this example, the costs of the 
regulation exceed the benefits; it is inefficient. But by hypothesis, the regulation makes 
its beneficiaries of the regulation better off. If the WTP criterion is used, the fact that the 
monetized costs exceed the monetized benefits is decisive.  But as a normative matter, the 
analysis here is far harder than in the easy cases. On what assumption should the WTP 
numbers be decisive?    
The assumption must be that economic efficiency is the goal of government, at 
least in the context of regulation – that in order to know what to do, we should aggregate 
the benefits and costs of regulation, and act if and only if the benefits exceed the costs. 
When using the WTP numbers, government is acting as a maximization machine,   
aggregating  all benefits and costs as measured by the WTP criterion. But this is a highly 
contestable understanding of what government should be doing. In fact it represents a 
shift from the relatively uncontroversial Pareto criterion, exemplified above, to a version 
                                                 
129 The Office of Management and Budget has expressly recognized this point in its most recent guidelines 
governing regulatory impact analysis. See 2003 Report to Congress at 131: “Those who bear the costs of a 
regulation and those who enjoy its benefits often are not the same people. . . . Your regulatory impact 
analysis should provide a separate description of distributional effects (i.e., how both benefits and costs are 
distributed among sub-populations of particular concern) so that decision makers can properly consider 
them along with the effects on economic efficiency.” 
130 For relevant discussion, see Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 223 (2000). 
Jolls argues that accommodation mandates might produce desired redistributive gains whether or not they 
are efficient, and she supplies a detailed analysis of when those gains are most likely to occur. At present, 
there is no parallel discussion for regulation of the sort I am discussing here. My suggestion is that under 




of the far more controversial Kaldor-Hicks criterion,
131 which assesses policy by asking 
this question: Are the gainers winning more than the losers are losing? The Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion is sometimes described as potential Pareto superiority,
132 because it asks 
whether in principle, the winners could compensate the losers, and a surplus could be left 
over. The difficulty of course is that Pareto superiority is merely potential. Some people 
really are losing and others are gaining.  
In the harder cases, the gainers are gaining less (in monetary terms) than the 
losers are losing -- and hence the regulation is said to be unjustified. Under the 
assumptions I have given, the regulation is indeed inefficient: Its social cost is higher 
than its social benefit. But is the regulation undesirable? This is not at all clear.  The first 
problem is that WTP is measuring gains and losses in monetary terms, rather than in 
welfare terms.
133 It is possible that those who gain, in the harder cases, gain more welfare 
than the losers lose; WTP is not dispositive on that question. The second problem is 
distributional. Suppose that in terms of overall welfare, the regulation is not desirable; it 
makes aggregate welfare lower rather than higher.  But suppose too that those who 
benefit are more advantaged than those who lose. If, for example, those who are willing 
to pay $80 are disproportionately poor, and those who pay the remainder are 
disproportionately wealthy, the regulation might be plausibly justified despite the welfare 
loss.  
It is natural to respond here that if redistribution is what is sought, then it should 
be produced not through regulation but through the tax system, which is a more efficient 
way of transferring resources to those who need help.
134 I agree. But suppose that 
                                                 
131 It is only a version of that criterion, because it is measuring welfare in monetary equivalents. A direct 
assessment of welfare, if it were possible, might show that the regulation in question is justified on Kaldor-
Hicks grounds. 
132 See, e.g., Richard Posner. Economic Analysis of Law 14 (4
th ed. 1992) (“The Kaldor-Hicks concept is 
also and suggestively called potential Pareto superiority: The winners could compensate the losers, whether 
or not they actually do.”). 
133 On the direct measurement of welfare, see Daniel Kahneman, forthcoming. 
134 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient Than the Income 
Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. Legal Stud. 667, 667 (1994) (“[R]edistribution through legal rules 
offers no advantage over redistribution through the income tax and typically is less efficient.”); Steven 
Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rulemaking, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers 
& Proc.) 414, 414 (1981) (describing how income tax can compensate for inefficient liability rules and 
redistribute income); David A. Weisbach, Should Legal Rules Be Used to Redistribute Income?, 70 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 439, 439–40 (2003) (“[T]he tax system is a better tool for redistribution of income than legal 




redistribution is not going to happen through the tax system. If so, then the regulation in 
the harder cases cannot be ruled off-limits despite its inefficiency. 
Return finally to the use of VSL in poor nations in the regulatory context that is 
my principal focus here. Suppose that in such nations, VSL turns out to be $100,000. If 
relevant governments use a VSL of $6 million, on the theory that their citizens should not 
be valued less than those of wealthy nations, social harm will almost inevitably result. In 
the easy cases, the forced exchanges will be ludicrously harmful to the people they are 
supposed to help. In the hard cases, where the beneficiaries pay only a fraction of the 
cost, such a nation will be spending far too much of its money on risk reduction (or more 
precisely, on reducing the risks that happen to get onto the regulatory agenda). The 
inefficiency of an extremely high VSL will be felt acutely and in many forms, including 
decreased employment. But if the costs of risk reduction will be paid by third parties – 
for example, wealthy nations – then the people in that poor country will be helped even if 
risk reduction is based on an excessive VSL.  
Of course they would almost certainly be helped more if they were given cash 
(supposing that it would not be squandered) rather than in-kind benefits. But if cash 
redistribution is not possible, regulatory benefits, provided for free or for a fraction of 
their cost, remain a blessing. If, for example, a global institution uses a world-wide VSL 
of $1 million, and if that amount exceeds the domestic VSL of people in poor nations, it 
is possible that poor people will gain a greater deal if the resources for risk-reduction are 
provided by wealthy nations. In the harder cases, the simple point is that many of the 
intended beneficiaries of regulation are in fact net gainers. 
 
D. Harder Cases as Easy Ones, and VSL Again 
Is there a reason to treat the harder cases as identical to the easy ones? Is this 
absurd
135? Agencies do not distinguish between them, although recent guidelines, calling 
agencies to attend to distributional issues, might eventually encourage them to do so.
136 A 
possible reason for treating the harder cases as the easy ones is optimistic: Perhaps 
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muddled and incoherent, current practice is of course on thin ground. 




everything will balance out in the end. Perhaps no group will be systematically helped or 
hurt, and the tax system will be used to produce appropriate redistribution. In the real-
world domestic cases, we might also think that a direct inquiry into welfare, bypassing 
WTP, would be extremely difficult or perhaps even impossible to operationalize. If 
distributional considerations are deemed relevant, interest-group warfare might be the 
consequence, rather than distribution to those who particularly need and deserve help.
137 
More modestly, we might conclude that agencies should generally pursue efficiency, 
using VSL as the foundation for decisions, but should allow distributional findings to cut 
the other way in cases in which there is compelling reason to allow them to do so. In fact 
this approach is a plausible way of reading OMB’s current guidelines on regulatory 
impact analysis.
138 
Let us return in this light to VSL. In the easy cases, the resulting redistribution is 
almost certainly perverse, because forced exchanges, under the stated assumptions, are 
highly likely to harm the people who are being coerced. But in the harder cases, it cannot 
be said that the beneficiaries of regulation will be harmed if government uses a number 
that exceeds their actual VSL. Everything depends on the distributional effects of the 
regulation. If the beneficiaries are well-off, a high VSL might produce perverse 
redistribution if those who lose are toward the bottom of the economic ladder. We could 
imagine this result, for example, with a pollution program that protects those who visit 
expensive recreational areas.  If the beneficiaries are poor, and if the costs are born by the 
wealthy or more generally, a high VSL might be in the interest of those who need help. 
Air pollution programs, providing special protection for those in cities, appear to be an 
example.
139 We can therefore reject the confident view of economically inclined analysts 
who believe that accurate VSLs, based on actual WTP (and hence individuated), should 
always be the basis of regulatory policy. But we can also reject the confident view of 
skeptics who believe that a uniform WTP, refusing to make distinctions among persons, 
is best on distributive grounds. 
What are the implications for individuation of VSL? It remains true that according 
to the theory that underlies agency valuations, a higher degree of individuation would be 
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desirable.  It also remains true that with respect to risks, individuation is appropriate 
insofar as valuations differ depending on the nature of the risk at stake. The principal 
qualification is that a uniform VSL, one that gives disadvantaged people regulatory 
protection in excess of their WTP, might turn out to have fortunate distributional 
consequences in the harder cases. We should be careful about this point. It will not 
always hold, and if the goal is to provide more assistance to those in need, a uniform VSL 
is hardly the best way to achieve that goal. Consider the case of poor nations: a 
worldwide VSL, adopted by each nation, of $6.1 million would almost certainly be 
harmful, simply because the resulting levels of regulation would have such adverse 
effects on wages and employment levels. (In these circumstances it is unsurprising that 
workers in wealthy nations, not in poor ones, often clamor the loudest for greater 
protection of workers in poor nations; workers in wealthier nations would be the principal 
beneficiaries of such regulation, which would protect them against competition from 
those in poorer nations.) My only point is that in some cases, individuation across persons 
will produce worse outcomes on distributional grounds and possibly on grounds of 
welfare as well. 
How, then, should global institutions, like the International Panel on Climate 
Change, assess the monetary costs of risks faced by people all over the world? As I have 
suggested, the answer turns on the purpose of the assessment – on what issue the answer 
is supposed to be addressing. There is no good acontextual way of deciding on the 
aggregate costs of global climate change by 2050; actually that is a ludicrous question, 
because it does not (as stated) have any point. A far more sensible question is whether it 
would make sense for any particular nation to accept a particular way of responding to 
the problem, such as the Kyoto Protocol.
140 At the national level, an assessment of the 
costs and benefits of the Kyoto Protocol is not much different from an assessment of the 
costs and benefits of any other regulation. If the risk of death, as a result of climate 
change, is in the neighborhood of 1 in 100,000, then the ordinary framework applies, with 
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appropriate individuation across both risks and persons.
141 For wealthy nations, the 
argument for signing the Kyoto Protocol is strengthened by the fact that the harms of 
global warming will be felt disproportionately in poor nations,
142 and also by the fact that 
wealthy nations have done by far the most to produce the situation that makes global 
warming a serious problem.  An analysis of these questions would make it necessary to 
go far beyond the present topic. My goal here has been to suggest that within nations, 
diverse VSL are perfectly sensible, and that answers to questions about valuation must be 




The theory that animates current valuations of mortality risks argues in favor of 
far more individuation. A uniform VSL cannot possibly cut across all risks and all 
individuals. Does the risk involve cancer?  What kind of cancer? Does it involve air 
pollution or driving on the highways? It is obtuse to adopt an approach that values all 
statistically equivalent mortality risks in the same way. In addition, individuals display a 
great deal of heterogeneity in their VSL – not simply because of different tastes and 
values, but also because of different levels of income and wealth. Willingness to pay 
depends on ability to pay. Nothing I have said here is meant to suggest approval of 
existing distributions of resources. Certainly it is appropriate for government to provide 
resources directly to poor people or instead to subsidize the provision of regulatory 
benefits. But forced exchanges are not a good way to assist poor people, and a uniform 
VSL is often a perverse response to inequality. In theory, risk reduction policies should 
be more fully individuated, giving each person regulatory protection that corresponds to 
his WTP for the particular risk in question.  
Of course this is not practicable. Government lacks the necessary information 
about individual risk preferences; categorical judgments are inevitable. In any case many 
of the benefits provided by regulation are collective in character. Regulators cannot 
feasibly provide protection to one person without simultaneously providing protection to 
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many. But it is nonetheless important to see what the current theory counsels in principle, 
and to understand that the limitations are practical ones, some of which might be 
overcome as knowledge progresses. And even with the practical limitations, a uniform 
VSL is increasingly difficult to justify.  
We know enough to know that some risks produce a higher VSL than others -- a 
judgment that would produce significantly different analyses in many cases, above all by 
producing a higher VSL for cancer risks. A program that protects old people will produce 
a lower VSL than one that protects younger people, and there is no ethical objection to 
variations on the basis of age.
143 And if a program affects mostly wealthy people, a VSL 
based on the population-wide median will be too low. It would follow that the Federal 
Aviation Administration should have a relatively high VSL, because people who fly are 
wealthier than the population median – and when the EPA is engaging in cost-benefit 
analysis for programs protecting poor people from risks associated with hazardous waste 
sites, it should have a relatively low VSL.  
The principal qualification here is that when the beneficiaries of regulation do not 
pay all of its cost, a high VSL may actually be in their interests. The easy cases, in which 
the beneficiaries are forced to pay for regulatory benefits, are not the same as those in 
which they pay only a fraction of the cost. Nonetheless, current practice treats them as 
identical, perhaps because of the great difficulty in untangling the incidence of regulatory 
benefits and costs. My goal has not been to resolve that difficulty, but to suggest that the 
theory behind current practice justifies far more individuation of VSL than regulators 
currently provide. However we deal with distributional problems and the hardest cases, 
the use of a uniform VSL is unacceptably obtuse. 
 
  
                                                 
143 See Aldy and Viscusi, supra; Sunstein, supra. I am putting to one side the difficult questions raised by 
the need to produce a VSL for children. 